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Abstract—This paper establishes a connection between the
notion of observation (or monitoring) structure in game theory
and the one of communication channels in Shannon theory. One
of the objectives is to know under which conditions an arbitrary
monitoring structure can be transformed into a more pertinent
monitoring structure. To this end, a mediator is added to the
game. The objective of the mediator is to choose a signalling
scheme that allows the players to have perfect, almost perfect or
public monitoring and all of this, at a minimum cost in terms
of signalling. Graph coloring, source coding, and channel coding
are exploited to deal with these issues. A wireless power control
game is used to illustrate these notions but the applicability
of the provided results and, more importantly, the framework
of transforming monitoring structures go much beyond this
example.
I. INTRODUCTION
Observation or monitoring structures are omnipresent in
games, especially in dynamic games. Monitoring structures
specify what the players effectively observe. These observa-
tions allow a given player to construct his private history,
which is used, at a given instant, as an input of a function
defining his strategy. For instance, observations may consist of
action profiles (this is the case in repeated games with perfect
monitoring [19] and fictitious play [3]), arbitrary signals (this
is the case in repeated games with public signals [20] and with
an observation graph [15]), or realizations of the individual
utility function (this is the case in stochastic games between
learning automata [17] and repeated game with incomplete
information [8]). The problem is that when players interact in
a game with an arbitrary observation structure, the possible
outcomes might turn out to be unpredictable and, even when
they are, they might not have important properties such as
Nash equilibria. To be concrete, the characterization of equilib-
rium utilities in repeated games with an arbitrary observation
structure is still an open problem [16]. In interactive situations
where game theory is relevant like distributed power control
in wireless networks [11], it is common that terminals do not
observe the transmit power levels of the other terminals [12],
[13]. Being not able to predict all possible operating points for
such a network may cause a problem for the network designer.
In particular, ensuring the existence of efficient Nash equilibria
can be highly desirable when terminals implement learning
algorithms with partial observations [21].
The above considerations show the importance of being able
to transform a given monitoring structure into a new one. But,
how can this be done? And at what price? This paper precisely
falls in the general framework which consist in proposing
solutions to implement such transformations and evaluating
their cost in terms of signalling. As far as the provided results
are concerned, the authors do not provide complete answers
to these new questions. Indeed, the scope of this paper is as
follows. First, one way to transform a monitoring structure
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Fig. 1. Interpreting the monitoring structure of a dynamic game as a
communication problem.
into a new one is to add a mediator (see Fig. I) in the game:
this mediator does not have a strategic role here and is only
used for improving the observation capabilities of the players.
Second, even if the initial monitoring structure (without the
mediator) can be effectively arbitrary, the desired monitoring
resulting from the addition of the mediator is assumed to be
perfect, almost perfect or public, and therefore not arbitrary
(the latter case is left as a significant extension of this work).
In the example of distributed power control, the players would
be the decisionnally autonomous terminals while the mediator
would be a base station or a relay node. Whereas the ideas
presented here seem seducing, the question is how to tackle
this general problem. One of the contributions of this paper is
to re-interpret observation structures in games as channels in
communication theory. Exploiting this interpretation, several
questions arise. Based on what the mediator observes, does
there exist a source code (at the mediator) which allows the
players to re-establish a perfect, almost perfect or public obser-
vation of an information source (the action profiles typically)?
What is the minimum cost of signalling to re-establish such an
observation structure? Is the Shannon capacity [18] associated
with the initial observation structure high enough to convey the
required amount of signalling? Shannon theory [4] and graph
theory [2] brings appropriate answers to all these questions.
As it will be seen, the connection we establish between game
theory and Shannon theory opens many other interesting issues
such as: proving some equilibrium utilities are impossible to
reach in certain games because of limited channel capacities
of the considered observation structure; defining new channels
in communication theory from observation scenarios in game
theory.
We provide a characterization of compatible monitoring
structure and a coding scheme that reconstruct ε-Perfect Mon-
itoring in Sec. III. After computing the price of re-establishing
the almost perfect monitoring (PREEPM) we investigate the
reconstruction of Perfect Monitoring of the source in Sec.
IV, and the one-shot reconstruction of the almost Perfect
Monitoring in Sec. V. We illustrate our results with the well-
known “prisoner’s dilemma” in Sec. VI. The proof of the
theorem are provided in the appendices A.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The purpose of this section is twofold: to review some
basic concepts and definitions from dynamic games, which are
essential for understanding the subsequent sections; to state the
general problem under investigation. Following the definition
of Bas¸ar and Olsder ([1] pp. 205), a dynamic game consists in
a sequence of stage games Γ = (Gt)t∈N∗ where at each stage
t ∈ N∗, we have:
Gt = (K, {Pti }i∈K, {π
t
i}i∈K, ω
t, f t,
{Sti}i∈K, {g
t
i}i∈K, {h
t
i}i∈K, {τ
t
i }i∈K)
Denote K = {1, ...,K} the set of players constant along
the game, Pt1, ...,P
t
K are the corresponding sets of actions,
πt1, ..., π
t
K are the payoff (or cost) functions, ω
t is the state
parameter and f t is the state transition function, gt1, ..., g
t
K
are the private monitoring functions at stage t and St1, ...,S
t
K
are the corresponding sets of private signals, ht1, ..., h
t
K are
the private histories and τ t1, ..., τ
t
K are the strategy functions.
Game stages correspond to time intervals at the beginning of
which players can choose their actions.
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Fig. 2. The private monitoring channel.
The strategic information is modeled by an information
source where a(t) is produced by the source at stage t.
This strategic information may consists in action profiles or
arbitrary signals. We assume that, for a given game stage
t ≥ 1, each player i ∈ K knows and can take into account
the past realizations of his private observation si drawn from
the private monitoring gi (see Fig. II). Denote ∆(Z) the set
of probabilities over the set Z .
gi : A −→ ∆(Si) (1)
The main difference between static games and dynamic games
is that players can take into account the sequence of past
strategic signals in their long-run strategy. Increasing the
amount of strategic information, increase the strategy space of
the players. The vector hti = (si(1), ..., si(t−1)) is the private
history of player i, at stage t and lies in the set Hti = (Si)
t−1
.
A strategy τi for player i ∈ K is a sequence of strictly causal
functions (τi,t)t≥1,
τi,t : H
t
i → P
t
i (2)
Let Ti be the set of strategies τi of player i ∈ K and τ =
(τ1, ..., τK) be a joint strategy.
We introduce an additive signalling structure called “the
mediator assisted monitoring channel”, represented in Fig.
(3). It consist of a triple (W ,m, f) where W denote the
mediator, m the observation channel of the mediator and f
the communication channel between the mediator and the
players. The mediator also observes a noisy version q of
the information source a. It’s has to relay every relevant
information to the players in order to make them monitors the
information source. The observation channel of the mediator
is defined as follows. Denote A the set of strategic information
and Q the set of signals observed by the mediator.
m : A −→ ∆(Q) (3)
The communication channel between the mediator and the
players where X is the set of channel inputs and Yi is the
set of signals observed by player i ∈ K.
f : X −→ ∆(Y1 × Y2) (4)
Thus at each stage t ≥ 1 of the game, the players obtain a
private observation sti and a mediator’s signal y
t
i . We investi-
gates the properties of such an additive signalling structure in
order to answer the question: Are the players able to observes
the information source or not ?
Denote aˆti the reconstructed version of the source by player
i ∈ K. The course of the signalling process begins with the
strategic information a, generated by the source at a given
stage. The mediator W is assumed to have an imperfect ob-
servation (namely q) of the symbols a generated by the source
and knows the information structure of every player. Taking
this knowledge into account, the mediator applies certain
mathematical operations on what it observes and broadcasts
a public signal x to all the players. Therefore, each player
i ∈ K receives a private signal si and an additional signal
from the mediator denoted by yi.
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Fig. 3. The mediator-assisted monitoring channel.
III. RECONSTRUCTION OF THE ε-PERFECT MONITORING
In this section, we investigate the reconstruction of the
ε-Perfect Monitoring. We introduce an additive signalling
structure (W ,m, f) which operates as a relay in order to send
an additional signal to the players. We provide conditions over
the additive signalling structure in order the players monitors
almost perfectly the source of strategic information. We first
recall the definition of ε-perfect monitoring available in the
literature [5], [9] and we present a “max-min formulation” to
compute the error parameter ε. Then we define properly the
“reconstruction” of the ε-perfect monitoring at the players.
Based on a graph-coloring approach, we provide two con-
ditions over the additive signalling structure (W ,m, f) that
are sufficient to reconstruct the ε-perfect monitoring for the
players. We call the first condition: “the (x, y)-coloring con-
dition”. It regards the observation function of the mediator m
and it guarantee that the mediator can reconstruct the ε-perfect
monitoring. The second condition concerns the communication
channel f between the mediator and the players and is called
the “essential information condition”. It guarantee that the
capacity of the channel f allows the mediator to communicate
the strategic information to the players.
In this section, we investigate the reconstruction problem
using the framework of Shannon [18]. We make the following
assumptions on the information source, the private monitoring
and the mediator assisted channel.
• The information source is discrete and i.i.d.
• The monitoring structure is stationary.
• The players may tolerate a delay in the signalling.
These assumption allow us to derive the fundamental limit
derived by Shannon on the information transmission. The
results, we present in this section, are based on the three
above assumptions. However, the strategies of the players
may not always satisfy this properties. We relax these three
hypothesis in Sec. (V) and we derive alternative limits over
the information transmission.
Definition 1: [5], [9] A monitoring Λ : A −→ ∆(
∏
i∈K Σi)
is ε-perfect (or almost perfect) if for each player i ∈ K there
exists a partition Ti = {T ai : a ∈ A} of the signals Σi such
that for all a ∈ A, ∑
σi∈Tai
Λ(σi|a) ≥ 1− ε (5)
We characterize the precision of the monitoring using a “max-
min formulation”.
Proposition 1: A monitoring Λ is ε-perfect if and only if
1− ε = min
i∈K
max
Ti=(Tai )a
min
a∈A
∑
σi∈Tai
Λ(σi|a)
⇐⇒ ε = max
i∈K
min
Ti=(Tai )a
max
a∈A
∑
σi /∈Tai
Λ(σi|a)
Proof: See Appendix A
After a joint action a is played, each player i ∈ K obtains
a private signal si drawn from a private monitoring gi.
gi : A −→ ∆(Si) ∀i ∈ K (6)
The mediator observes a signal q drawn from the observation
channel m.
m : A −→ ∆(Q) (7)
Then it send through the communication channel f an additive
signal to each players.
f : X −→ ∆(
∏
i∈K
Yi) (8)
This communication procedure induces a pair of signals σi =
(si, yi) for each player where si comes from the private moni-
toring gi and yi comes from the additional signalling structure
(W ,m, f). We derive conditions over the additional signalling
structure (W ,m, f) such that the joint signal σi = (si, yi)
satisfies the ε-perfect condition.
A. Reconstruction of the ε-Perfect Monitoring
We define the notion of code in this framework. The
mediator observes a sequence of signals q and reduce it to
what we called the “essential information sequence” r using a
graph coloring argument. Then it encodes the sequences r into
a sequence x using a joint source-channel coding procedure.
The players will decode the “essential information” r using
the channel output yi and the private observation si. This “es-
sential information sequence” r combined with the sequence
of private monitoring si characterizes a unique sequence a of
joint actions.
Definition 2: A (n, h, φ, (ψi)i∈K)-code is a pair of encod-
ing functions for the mediator:
h : Q −→ R, “essential information”
φ : Rn −→ Xn, “source-channel encoding”
and a decoding function for each player:
ψi : Y
n
i × S
n
i −→ A
n, ∀i ∈ K, “source-channel decoding”
We quantify the precision of the joint signal σi = (si, yi)
using the following definition.
Definition 3: The mediator can reconstruct the ε-Perfect
Monitoring if,
∀δ > 0, ∃(n, h, φ, (ψi)i∈K)-process such that,
P
[
∃{T ai }a∈A, ∀a ∈ A,
∑
σi∈Tai
Λ(σi|a) ≥ 1− ε
]
≥ 1− δ
For a given private monitoring structure (gi)i∈K , we provide
sufficient conditions over the additive signalling structure
(W ,m, f) such that the mediator can reconstruct the ε-perfect
monitoring. Two natural questions arises : When the mediator
observation function m is sufficiently precise to guarantee the
ε-perfect monitoring at the players ? When the communication
channel f between the mediator and the players allows to
transmit all the relevant information ?
We provide an answer to the first question using the (x, y)-
coloring condition in the next subsection (III-B). The second
question will be investigate in subsection (III-C) using the
concept of “rate of essential information”.
B. The (x, y)-coloring Condition
We define the (x, y)-coloring condition in order to charac-
terize the observation functions m of the mediator that are
compatible with every private monitoring gi of the players
i ∈ K. This condition is based on a graph-coloring approach.
We represent the private monitoring gi using an auxiliary graph
(see Def. 5) whose vertices are the joint actions a. There is
an edge e between two vertices a and a′ if both joint action
induce the same signal si with large probability.
The main idea is the following. If the observation of the
mediator m is a coloring of the auxiliary graphs, then the
information m passing through the mediator is completely
orthogonal to the private information gi. Thus every joint
actions can be distinguished by the players and the ε-perfect
monitoring can be reconstructed.
Definition 4: Define the equivalence classes of actions for
each of the private monitoring gi with i ∈ K as follows.
Gi(a) = {si ∈ Si, gi(si|a) > 1/2}, (9)
a ∼gi b⇐⇒ Gi(a) = Gi(b) (10)
Denote Agi = {αi} the partition of A into equivalence classes
with respect to the relation ∼gi . In the same way with the
monitoring m.
M(b) = {q ∈ Q, m(q|b) > 1/2}, (11)
a ∼m b⇐⇒M(a) =M(b) (12)
Denote Am = {αm} the partition of A into equivalence
classes with respect to the relation ∼m. These equivalence
classes induce a family of auxiliary monitoring defined by.
g˜i : Agi −→ ∆(Si)
|A| (13)
αi −→ (gi(s|a))a∈αi (14)
and
m˜ : Am −→ ∆(Q)
|A| (15)
αm −→ (m(q|a))a∈αm (16)
The precision of the auxiliary monitoring g˜i and m˜ are
computed in the following way. Let {Sα}α∈Agi a partition
of the signals s of player i indexed by the equivalence classes
α ∈ Agi . Define in the same way {Qβ}β∈Am a partition of
the signals q of mediator indexed by the equivalence classes
β ∈ Am.
max
Sα
min
α∈Agi
min
a∈α
∑
s/∈Sα
gi(s|a) = xi (17)
max
Qβ
min
β∈Am
min
a∈β
∑
q/∈Qβ
m(q|a) = y (18)
The monitoring g˜i is xi-perfect and m˜ is y-perfect.
Definition 5: The auxiliary graph of player i ∈ K, denoted
Gi = (A,Ei) is defined as follows,
∃ei = (a, b) ∈ Ei ⇐⇒ a ∼gi b (19)
Inspired from graph coloring we define the following concept
of (x, y)-coloring.
Definition 6: The monitoring gi and m satisfy an (x, y)-
coloring condition if :
• The auxiliary monitoring g˜i is x perfect,
• The auxiliary monitoring m˜ is y perfect,
• The partition {Qβ}β∈Am induced by the auxiliary mon-
itoring m˜ is a coloring c : A −→ Q of the graph Gi.
Remark that the last condition is equivalent to the following
one: the auxiliary monitoring g˜i is a coloring of the graph Gm
defined by em = (a, b) ∈ Em ⇐⇒ a ∼m b.
C. The Rate of Essential Information
We define the rate of essential information in order to
characterize the channels f between the mediator and the
players that are compatible with the amount of information the
players need. It could happened that the observation channel
m of the mediator satisfy the above (x, y)-coloring condition,
but not all the information q is relevant.
In this subsection, we aim at reducing the relevant in-
formation to it’s minimum. To do so, we use a second
coloring condition over a bi-auxiliary graph G˜ to eliminate
any redundant information between the signals q and si. We
call the “essential information” the sequence r corresponding
to a concatenation of the sequence of signals q.
Definition 7: The bi-auxiliary graph G˜ = (Q, E˜) is defined
as follows,
∃e = (q, q′) ∈ E˜ ⇐⇒ ∃i ∈ K, ∃a, b ∈ A, s.t. (20)
q ∈ m(a), (21)
q′ ∈ m(b), (22)
a ∼gi b (23)
Definition 8: Let h˜ : Q −→ R the minimal coloring of the
bi-auxiliary graph G˜ and denote the random variable r essential
information drawn from the distribution h˜⊗m⊗ p such that
P (r) =
∑
a,q p(a)m(q|a)h˜(r|q).
Define the essential rate as follows.
H = max
i∈K
H(r|si) (24)
where the random variable si is drawn from the transition
Ti : R −→ ∆(Si) with,
Ti(s|r) =
∑
a,q P(a, q, r, s)∑
a,q P(a, q, r)
(25)
=
∑
a,q p(a)m(q|a)h˜(r|q)gi(s|a)∑
a,q
∑
a,q p(a)m(q|a)h˜(r|q)
(26)
In the following, such a mapping h is called recoloring of
monitoring m. The following coding theorem for broadcast
channel with common messages [10] provides us an upper
bound for transmits to the players the strategic information.
Theorem 1 (Korner, Marton 1977 [10]): The capacity C0
of the broadcast channel f : X −→ ∆(
∏
i∈K Yi) with
common messages is exactly,
C0 = max
p∈∆(X)
min
i∈K
I(X ;Yi) (27)
The coding theorem we present is constructed over large
blocs of strategic signals. Its implies that the players may
tolerate a delay in the reconstruction of the ε-perfect moni-
toring. This assumption is relaxed in section (V) below and
an alternative result is presented.
D. Main Result
We provide two conditions that ensure the additive sig-
nalling structure (W ,m, f) is compatible with the recon-
struction of the ε-perfect monitoring. The first condition is
based on the (x, y)-coloring condition (see subsection (III-B))
and guarantees that the mediator is sufficiently informed
to help the players reconstruct the desired monitoring. The
second condition is based on the “essential information” (see
subsection (III-C)) and ensures that the additional information
the mediator obtains, is compatible with the communication
constraints of the channel between the mediator and the
players.
Condition (1) : There exists a pair (x, y) such that x+ y−
xy ≤ ε and for each player i ∈ K, the private monitoring
gi and the monitoring of the mediator m satisfy an (x, y)-
coloring condition.
Condition (2) : The essential rate H satisfy H ≤ C0, the
capacity C0 of the channel f with common messages.
Theorem 2 (ε-PM): Fix a strategy profile p ∈ ∆(A), a
monitoring structure M = (m, (gi)i∈K, f) and an ε > 0.
If the monitoring structure M satisfy conditions (1) and (2),
then the mediator can reconstruct the ε-Perfect Monitoring.
Proof: The proof is detailed in Appendix A.
We provide conditions over the additive signalling structure
(W ,m, f) that are sufficient to reconstruct the ε-perfect moni-
toring for the players. Note that a complete characterization is
not available due to the problem of characterizing the precision
of a two parallel monitoring functions.
We obtain a set of admissible additive signalling structure
(W ,m, f) and we need an evaluation method to choose the
best admissible additive signalling structure (W ,m, f) in term
of signalling cost. For that reasons, we introduce the price of
re-establishing ε-perfect monitoring as the ratio between the
number of bits of the additive signalling and the number of
bits of the source of strategic information.
Definition 9: Define the price of re-establishing ε-Perfect
Monitoring:
PREEPM∞(ε) =
maxi∈KH(R|Si)
H(A)
(28)
The worst case correspond to the situation where the mediator
directly send the entire sequence of joint actions a. In that case
the price is equal to 1. Obviously, the players would have all
the strategic information and they can reconstruct the moni-
toring perfectly. However, this situation is not very interesting
from our point of view since the capacity constraints between
the mediator and the players may forbid the transmission of
the strategic information.
Finding the minimal price of re-establishing ε-perfect mon-
itoring is equivalent to finding the optimal admissible additive
signalling structure (W ,m, f).
IV. RECONSTRUCTION OF THE PUBLIC MONITORING
The problem of strategic observation are well studied in the
framework of repeated game with public monitoring. In this
section, we assume that the source of strategic information is
no more a joint action but a public signal. For example, if the
public signal we consider satisfies the “individual and pairwise
full rank conditions” of [6], then the set of the equilibria is
fully characterized even if the game is stochastic. We extend
our results to the perfect reconstruction of the information
source without error (i.e. where ε = 0). We provide sufficient
and necessary conditions on the additional signalling structure
W for being compatible with the reconstruction of the perfect
monitoring.
A. The “Painting” Condition
The main difference here is the precision of the monitoring
of the information source: ε = 0. We provide here a necessary
and sufficient condition over the observation function m of
the mediator such as reconstruct the perfect monitoring of the
source of strategic information. This condition is also based
on graph coloring and we called it “the painting condition” in
reference to C. Berge.
We construct a graph where the vertices are the public
signals a. There is an edge between to publics signals a and a′
if the same private signal si is drawn with positive probability.
We prove that the observation of the mediator is orthogonal
to the private monitoring if and only if the observations q of
the mediator is a coloring of the graph.
Definition 10: Denote the sets of possible signals.
Gi(a) = {si ∈ Si, gi(si|a) > 0}, ∀i ∈ K (29)
M(b) = {q ∈ Q, m(q|b) > 0} (30)
Definition 11: The auxiliary graph of player i ∈ K, denoted
Gi = (A,Ei) is defined as follows:
∃ei = (a, b) ∈ Ei ⇐⇒ Gi(a) ∩Gi(b) 6= ∅ (31)
We define the concept of painting of a graph G as a
correspondence m : A⇉ Q if every selection m¯ : A→ Q of
m is a coloring of the graph G.
Definition 12: The monitoring of the mediator m is a
painting of the family of graphs (Gi)i∈K induced by the private
monitoring (gi)i∈K if for all i ∈ K we have
∃ei = (a, b) ∈ Ei ⇐⇒ m(a) ∩m(b) = ∅ (32)
B. Main Result
As in the previous section, we provide two conditions (over
m and f ) such that the additive signalling structure (W ,m, f)
is compatible with the reconstruction of the perfect monitoring.
This result is stronger than the previous one because we
provide necessary and sufficient conditions.
Definition 13: Define the following conditions:
Condition (1′) : The monitoring of the mediator m is a
painting of the family of graphs (Gi)i∈K.
Condition (2) : The essential rate H satisfies H ≤ C0, the
capacity C0 of the channel f with common messages.
Theorem 3 (PM): Fix a strategy profile p ∈ ∆(A) and
monitoring structure M = (m, (gi)i∈K, f).
The mediator can reconstruct the Perfect Monitoring for
Strategy p if and only if the monitoring structure M satisfy
conditions (1′) and (2).
Proof: The proof is detailed in Appendix A.
We obtain a set of admissible additive signalling structure
(W ,m, f) and we introduce the price of re-establishing per-
fect monitoring in order to evaluate the performance of the
reconstruction.
Definition 14: Define the price of re-establishing Perfect
Monitoring:
PRPM∞(ε) =
maxi∈KH(R|Si)
H(A)
(33)
Finding the minimal price of re-establishing ε-perfect mon-
itoring is equivalent to finding the optimal admissible additive
signalling structure (W ,m, f) for reconstruct the perfect mon-
itoring of the information source.
V. ONE-SHOT RECONSTRUCTION OF THE ε-PERFECT
MONITORING
In the previous sections, we have assumed that the source of
strategic information was i.i.d., the channel was stationary and
the players tolerate a delay before reconstructing the desired
monitoring. In this section, we relax these three hypothesis
and we investigate a “one-shot” reconstruction of the ε-
perfect monitoring. Note that, the techniques we develop in
this section also apply to the reconstruction of the perfect
monitoring.
Once the strategic information is drawn, the mediator pro-
vides an additional information to the players before the end of
the game stage. The definition of the one-shot reconstruction
consists in replacing the number n of stages by 1 in the
definition of the long term reconstruction in Sec.III.
A. The Condition z-Perfect
The main difference regards the communication channel f
between the mediator and the players. Assuming the “one-
shot” reconstruction prevent us to use the classical coding
scheme from Shannon theory. We introduce the condition z-
perfect in order to characterize the channels f (see Fig. 3)
between the mediator and the players compatible with the one
shot reconstruction of the ε perfect monitoring.
Definition 15: The channel between the mediator and each
player is z-Perfect if, for each players, there exists a partition
Yi = {Y ri }r∈R of the signals indexed by the set of essential
information R such that for all r ∈ R:
∑
yi∈Y ri
f(yi|r) ≥ 1− z (34)
B. Main Result
The result of this section is widely based on the one in
section (III). Define as above the bi-auxiliary graph G˜, and
the mapping h˜ : Q −→ R is called recoloring of monitoring
m. The condition (2) with the entropy inequality of theorem
(2) is replaced by the z-perfect condition (2’).
Definition 16: Define the following conditions:
Condition (1) : For each player i ∈ K, the private monitoring
gi and the monitoring of the mediator m satisfy an (x, y)-
coloring condition.
Condition (2′) : The channel f between the mediator and each
player is z-Perfect.
Theorem 4 (ε-PM): Fix a strategy profile p ∈ ∆(A), a
monitoring structure M = (m, (gi)i∈K, f) and an ε > 0.
If the monitoring structure M satisfy conditions (1) and (2′)
with,
x+ y + z − xy − xz − zy + xyz ≤ ε (35)
Then the mediator can reconstruct the ε-Perfect Monitoring in
one-shot.
Proof: The proof is detailed in Appendix A.
We provide conditions over the additive signalling structure
(W ,m, f) that are sufficient to reconstruct the ε-perfect mon-
itoring in one-shot. Remark that a complete characterization
is not available.
In order to evaluate the best additive signalling structure
(W ,m, f), we introduce the price of one-shot re-establishing
the ε-Perfect Monitoring. In the one-shot case, the entropy
H(A) is replaced by log |A|.
Definition 17: Define the price of one-shot re-establishing
ε-Perfect Monitoring:
PREEPM =
log |R|
log |A|
(36)
Finding the minimal price of one-shot re-establishing ε-
perfect monitoring is equivalent to finding the optimal admis-
sible additive signalling structure (W ,m, f).
VI. PRISONER’S DILEMMA
We consider a simple wireless power control game where
our result may direclty apply. Following the framework of
Goodman and Mandayan [7], we consider a decentralized
multiple access channel where the players choose their power
control policy in order to maximize their energy efficiency.
We consider a two player power control game where the
actions are the transmit power p1 and p2. The energy-efficiency
utility is defined as follows:
ui(p1, p2) =
f(SINRi)
pi
[bit/J], i ∈ K (37)
where the function f(x) is sigmoidal (here we take f(x) =
(1− e−x)M . The SINR at receiver i ∈ K writes as:
SINRi =
pi|gi|2
pj|gj |2/N + σ2
(38)
with parameters |gi|2 for the channel gain and σ2 for the noise
variance.
In our previous work over this communication model [12],
we investigate two interesting power levels. The first is the
power of the Nash equilibrium denoted p∗i and the second is
the power of the operating point p˜i which provide a Pareto
optimal utility. The power p∗i and p˜i are defined respectively
in equation (4) and (9) of the article [12].
In order to illustrate our results, we provide an complete
analysis of a simple example which can be easily generalized.
We consider a two player power control game where only
two power levels (p∗i , p˜i) are available to the players. Fix
the parameters of the power control game for the random
CDMA case. The number of players K = 2, the number of
symbols M = 2, the spreading factor N = 2, the channel
gains |g1|2 = |g2|2 = 1 and the noise variance σ2 = 1.
The set of achievable utility is described by the following
payoff matrix. The utility pair (0.10, 0.34)mean that the utility
of player 1 is 0.10 and 0.34 is the utility of player 2. The
region of achievable utility using pure and mixed strategies is
represented by the quadrilateral on figure (4).
p˜2 p
∗
2
p˜1 0.23,0.23 0.10,0.34
p∗1 0.34,0.10 0.15,0.15
Remark that this game is strategically equivalent to the
Prisonner’s Dilemma where the Nash equilibrium correspond
to the joint action (p∗1, p
∗
2) and the social optimal action
correspond to (p˜1, p˜2). We consider as an example a private
monitoring structure g1, g2 as defined below. We fix the
additive signalling structure (W ,m, f), an i.i.d. mixed strategy
p ∈ ∆(A) and we prove it allow the reconstruction of the ε-
perfect monitoring. We compute the price of re-establishing
equilibrium conditions.
The source of strategic information in this case, represents
the sequence of actions of the players. The actions are sup-
posed to be drawn i.i.d. from a distribution over the set of
the players’ actions. Denote the private monitoring of player
i, gi : A −→ Si with precision parameters x′ ≤ x.
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b
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b
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b
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2
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2
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s′2
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1− x
1− x′
1− x′
1− x′
x
x
x′g1 g2
Denote Ag1 , Ag2 the equivalence classes of private moni-
toring g1 and g2 over the actions A.
A1 = {(p˜1p˜2, p˜1p
∗
2); (p
∗
1p˜2, p
∗
1p
∗
2)} = {α, α
′} (39)
A2 = {(p˜1p˜2, p
∗
1p˜2); (p˜1p
∗
2, p
∗
1p
∗
2)} = {β, β
′} (40)
These equivalence classes induce a pair of auxiliary monitor-
ing denoted
g˜1 : A1 −→ ∆(S1)
|A| (41)
α −→ (g1(s|a))a∈α (42)
g˜2 : A2 −→ ∆(S2)
|A| (43)
β −→ (g2(s|a))a∈β (44)
Taking the partitions Sα = s1 ; Sα′ = s
′
1 and Sβ = s2 ;
Sβ′ = s
′
2 we calculate the precision of the auxiliary monitoring
g˜1 and g˜2.
min
α∈A1
min
a∈α
∑
s∈Sα
g1(s|a) = x (45)
min
β∈A2
min
a∈β
∑
s∈Sβ
g2(s|a) = x
′ (46)
The monitoring g˜1 is x-perfect and g˜2 is x
′-perfect.
The monitoring graphs corresponding to the above equiva-
lence classes of the private observations are,
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2
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∗
1p
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∗
2
p∗1p˜2 p
∗
1p
∗
2
Gg˜1 Gg˜2
Note that by construction, each of those graph is an union
of complete graphs.
The mediator observes a signal drawn from m : A −→ Q.
Denote the equivalence classes of the monitoring m of the
mediator over the actions A.
Am = {(p˜1p˜2); (p˜1p
∗
2, p
∗
1p˜2); (p
∗
1p
∗
2))} = {γ, γ
′, γ′′}(47)
These equivalence classes induce an auxiliary monitoring
denoted
m˜ : Am −→ ∆(Q)
|A| (48)
γ −→ (m(q|a))a∈γ (49)
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y
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m
Taking the partitions Qγ = q1, Qγ′ = q2 and Qγ′′ = q3 we
calculate the precision of the auxiliary monitoring m˜.
min
γ∈Am
min
a∈γ
∑
q∈Qγ
m(q|a) = y (50)
The monitoring m˜ is y-perfect.
In order to decide whether the mediator can reconstruct the
desired monitoring, let us check if the auxiliary monitoring
m˜ of the mediator is a coloring of the graphs Gg˜1 and Gg˜2 of
the players. To illustrate this, we associate the colors blue, red
and green to respectively q1, q2 and q3. For each player i ∈
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q1 q2
q2 q3
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K, the pair of auxiliary monitoring (m, gi) satisfy an (x, y)-
coloring condition (recall that x′ ≤ x). Thus, the mediator gets
sufficient information to reconstruct the ε-perfect monitoring
at the players with ε = x+ y − xy.
To extract the essential information from mediator’s signal
q without decreasing the precision of the monitoring, let
us introduce the following bi-auxiliary graph. The coloring
b
b
b
q2
q1
q3
r1
r2
r1
Gm
h : Q −→ R of the above bi-auxiliary graph characterizes
the essential information the mediator should give to the
player in order to re-establish the ε-perfect monitoring. Recall
that this essential information is optimal in the sense of the
cardinality of R and of the precision of the monitoring. It
cannot be reduced without introducing a larger ambiguity
between action profiles for at least one player. The process
of strategic information is described as follows:
For each player i ∈ K, the pair of auxiliary monitoring (h◦
m, gi) still satisfy an (x, y)-coloring condition and is moreover
minimal in term of cardinality |R|. To reconstruct the ε-perfect
monitoring at the player, the mediator will send the common
information r such that each player, knowing the private signal
si can reconstruct the right action profile with probability more
than 1− ε.
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Suppose now that player 1 plays a mixed strategy (2/3, 1/3)
and player 2 plays a mixed strategy (2/3, 1/3). Assume from
now that they play repeatedly following this mixed strategy. A
sequence of action profiles is generated from the distribution
p ∈ ∆(A) and it leads to the payoff vector (0.22, 0.22) (see
Fig. (4)).
p˜2 p
∗
2
p˜1 4/9 2/9
p∗1 2/9 1/9
The entropy of such a distribution source is H(a) = log 9 −
4/3 ≃ 1.8366. Fix the noise level of the transitions functions
at x = x′ = y = 1/10. The process of information generated
a source of essential information (r1, r2) with distribution
(49/90, 41/90) of entropy H(r) ≃ 0.9943. To transmit the
source of essential information, the mediator considers the side
information si from the transition channel of player i.
Ti(s|r1) =
∑
a,q P(a, q, r, s)∑
a,q P(a, q, r)
(51)
=
∑
a,q p(a)m(q|a)h(r|q)gi(s|a)∑
a,q
∑
a,q p(a)m(q|a)h(r|q)
(52)
The transition matrix of the channel are evaluated.
T1(s1|r1) = 353/490 (53)
T1(s
′
1|r1) = 137/490 (54)
T1(s1|r2) = 217/410 (55)
T1(s
′
1|r2) = 193/410 (56)
We represent it as a binary channel. The channel transition
b
b
b
b
r2
r1
s′1
s1
353/490
217/410
137/490193/410
T1
of player 2 is also characterized and is found to be identical.
Using the Slepian and Wolf binning scheme, the entropy of
the essential information with side information writes as :
H = max
i∈K
H(R|Si) (57)
In this case, we have p(r1|s1) = 353/570, p(r2|s
′
1) =
217/330, p(r2|s1) = 193/570 and p(r1|s′1) = 137/330 and
T1 = T2. The minimal information rate sent by the mediator
to both players is
H = H(R|S1) = H(R|S2) ≃ 0.9451 (58)
Under the condition that the rates pair (H,H) belong to the
capacity region of the channel between the mediator and the
players, the mediator can reconstruct the ε-perfect monitoring
at the players with precision ε = x+ y − xy = 19/100.
The price of re-establishing ε-Perfect Monitoring writes:
PREEPM∞ =
maxi∈KH(r|si)
H(a)
≃
0.9451
1.8366
≃ 0.5145 (59)
Taking the same monitoring structure with a noise level
x = x′ = y = 0, we investigate the noiseless version of
the reconstruction of the perfect monitoring. The price of re-
establishing Perfect Monitoring becomes:
PRPM∞ =
maxi∈KH(r|si)
H(a)
≃ 0.5 (60)
We conclude that in the noiseless problem, the private monitor-
ing structure provides almost half the information needed by
the players to reconstruct the source of strategic information.
Whereas in the noisy case, the additional monitoring structure
is in charge by almost 51.5 % of the reconstruction the
strategic source of information.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The monitoring problem of strategic information is ad-
dressed in this paper. Taking into account the private monitor-
ing structure, a mediator is introduced in order to re-establish
ε-perfect monitoring at the players. In order to evaluate the
signaling cost for the mediator, the problem of the recon-
structing a strategic information is re-interpreted as a channel
of communication theory. Graph theory and Shannon theory
are respectively exploited to provide a characterization of the
admissible monitoring structure and analyze their efficiency
in term of “price of re-establishing ε-Perfect Monitoring”
(PREEPM ). A coding theorem is provided for the channels
where the mediator observes the source imperfectly and the
strategic information is drawn from an i.i.d. source. Chal-
lenging open problems appear when considering a source of
information generated by an arbitrary stochastic process. For
example, in the case of imperfect monitoring of past actions,
the players can choose an appropriate sequence of actions
such as to manipulate the coding schemes. Another interesting
extension is to consider a mediator that sends private messages
to the players instead of common messages. It would also be
of interest to provide conditions for changing an imperfect
monitoring structure M into another imperfect monitoring
structure M′ (not necessarily perfect or almost perfect).
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APPENDIX
By definition, ε is the minimum admissible value such that:
∃ T = (Ta)a, ∀a ∈ A,
∑
σi∈Ta
Λ(σi|a) ≥ 1− ε
⇐⇒ ∃ T = (Ta)a, min
a∈A
∑
σi∈Ta
Λ(σi|a) ≥ 1 − ε
⇐⇒ 1− ε ≤ max
T=(Ta)a
min
a∈A
∑
σi∈Ta
Λ(σi|a)
Taking the minimum admissible value for ε, the monitoring
Λ is ε-perfect if and only if there is equality in the above
equation.
Proof: We will prove that the conditions (1) and (2) are sufficient.
The first conditions (1) states that there exists a pair (x, y) such that x +
y − xy ≤ ε and for each player i ∈ K, the private monitoring gi and the
monitoring of the mediator m satisfy an (x, y)-coloring condition. Taking
now the minimal coloring of the bi-auxiliary graph h˜ : Q −→ R, we will
show that for every player i ∈ K, the joint monitoring (gi, h◦m) is x+y−xy
perfect.
Fix a player i ∈ K. Let {Qβ}β∈Am be the partition of signals q ∈ Q
indexed by the equivalence classes of A with respect to the monitoring m
and {Sα}α∈Agi the partition of signals s ∈ Si indexed by the equivalence
classes of A with respect to the monitoring gi. By hypothesis, {Qβ}β∈Am
is a coloring of the graph Ggi . We first show that (h˜(Qβ))β∈Am is still a
coloring of the graph Ggi . Take a and b two neighbor nodes of the graph Ggi .
By the coloring property, the sets of associated color Qα(a) and Qα(b) are
disjoint. Thus each pair of colors q ∈ Qα(a) and q′ ∈ Qα(b) are neighbor
in the bi-auxiliary graph. The coloring h˜ : Q −→ R of the bi-auxiliary graph
implies that (h˜(Qα))α∈Am is still a coloring of the graph Ggi . Second, the
coloring property implies that the following product Ta = Sα(a)×h˜(Qα(a))
defines a partition (Ta)a∈A of T . Let us calculate the precision of such a
joint monitoring. For all strategic information a ∈ A:
∑
s,r∈Ta
Λ(s, r|a) =
∑
s∈Sα(a)
gi(s|a)
∑
q∈Qβ (a)
∑
r∈h˜(Qβ (a))
h˜(r|q)m(q|a)
≥
∑
s∈Sα(a)
g(r|a)
∑
q∈Qβ (a)
m(q|a)
≥ (1 − y)(1 − x) = 1 − (x + y − xy)
Thus, for each player i ∈ K, the monitoring (gi, h˜◦m) satisfies an x+y−
xy-Perfect Monitoring condition. It remains to transmit that signal over the
broadcast channel with common messages f . The condition (2) states that the
essential rate H satisfies H ≤ C0, the capacity C0 of the broadcast channel f
with common messages [10]. The joint source-channel coding theorem states
that there exists appropriate mappings:
φ : Rn −→ Xn (61)
ψi : Y
n
i × S
n
i −→ A
n, ∀i ∈ K (62)
such that transmitting the source r over the broadcast channel with common
messages f is possible with an error probability Pne ≤ δ. The above mappings
correctly transmit every sequence rn with probability more than P(rn =
rˆn) ≥ 1− δ. When the sequence rn is correctly decoded, at each stages the
symbol r combined with the side symbol si for each player i, are associated to
an strategic information profile a where the stage error probability is bounded
by x+ y − xy. We proved that
P

∃Ti = {Tai : a ∈ A}, ∀a ∈ A,
∑
σi∈T
a
i
Λ(σi|a) ≥ 1 − ε

 ≥ 1 − δ
Proof: First we show that conditions (1′) and (2) are sufficient. The
monitoring of the mediator m is a painting of the family of graphs (Gi)i∈K .
This implies that for each player i ∈ K, for each pair of strategic information
a, b ∈ A, if the private signal as a positive probability to be the same, then
the signal observed by the mediator will distinguish them.
gi(a) ∩ gi(b) 6= ∅ =⇒ m(a) ∩m(b) = ∅ (63)
Moreover, the recoloring h : Q −→ R keeps this property. For all player
i ∈ K,
gi(a) ∩ gi(b) 6= ∅ (64)
q ∈ m(a), q′ ∈ m(b) =⇒ h(q) 6= h(q′) =⇒ r 6= r′ (65)
Condition (1′) implies that, for each player i ∈ K, the pair of information
(si, r) is sufficient to reconstruct the Perfect Monitoring.
Condition (2) states that H ≤ C0 which implies that the rate of this
information r is lower than the capacity of the channel between the mediator
and the player i ∈ K. Thus, by the source-channel coding theorem, we have
that:
∀ε > 0, ∃(n, h, φ, (ψi)i∈K)-process such that, P
n
e ≤ ε (66)
This implies that the mediator can reconstruct the Perfect Monitoring. Second,
we show that conditions (1′) and (2) are necessary. Suppose that condition
(2) does not hold. Then, by the source-channel coding theorem of Merhav
and Shamai (2003 [14]), it is impossible to transmit the source r over the
channel f with low error probability. The mediator cannot reconstruct the
Perfect Monitoring.
Suppose that condition (1′) does not hold. Then, there exists a player i and a
pair of strategic information a, b that have the same color s and there exists
an edge e = (a, b). This implies that with positive probability player i will
observe a private signal r and a public signal s when strategic information a
or b is drawn. Then, the mediator cannot reconstruct the Perfect Monitoring.
Proof: We ever show that the condition (1) is sufficient to reconstruct
x + y − xy-Perfect Monitoring in one shot. We show that if the family of
channels (fi)i∈K between the mediator and each player satisfy an z-perfect
condition (condition (2’)), then each player monitors with a precision at least
of x+y+z−xy−xz−yz+xyz. Let us calculate the precision of such a joint
monitoring received by player i is Λi : A −→ Si×Yi. For all joint strategic
information a ∈ A and for each player i ∈ K, the (x, y)-coloring property
guarantees the existence of a partition defined by T ia = S
i
α×Qβ ×Y
r
i such
that a ∈ α, a ∈ β and r ∈ h˜(Qβ). The precision of the joint monitoring is
upper bounded by,
∑
s,y∈Ta
Λi(s, y|a)
=
∑
s∈Siα
gi(s|a)
∑
q∈Qβ
∑
r∈h˜(Qβ)
∑
y∈Y r
i
fi(y|r)h˜(r|q)m(q|a)
≥
∑
s∈Siα
gi(s|a)
∑
q∈Qβ
m(q|a)
∑
r∈h˜(Qβ )
h˜(r|q)
∑
y∈Y r
i
fi(y|r)
=
∑
s∈Siα
gi(s|a)
∑
q∈Qβ
m(q|a)
∑
y∈Y r
i
fi(y|r)
≥ (1 − y)(1 − x)(1 − z)
= 1 − (x + y + z − xy − xz − zy + xyz)
For each player i ∈ K, the joint monitoring Λi = (gi, fi ◦ h˜ ◦ m) is
x+ y + z − xy − xz − yz + xyz perfect.
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Fig. 4. Nash Equilibrium, Operating Point and the Deviation Utilities for
(K,M,N) = (2, 2, 2)
